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Truth as one and many
~
Lynch, Michael P. (1966-)
Truth as one and many
紀錄類型:
書目-電子資源 : 單行本
正題名/作者:
Truth as one and many/ Michael P. Lynch.
作者:
Lynch, Michael P.
出版者:
Oxford :Oxford University Press, : c2009.,
面頁冊數:
x, 205 p. ;23 cm.;
標題:
Truth. -
電子資源:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199218738.001.0001
ISBN:
9780199218738
Truth as one and many
Lynch, Michael P.1966-
Truth as one and many
[electronic resource] /Michael P. Lynch. - Oxford :Oxford University Press,c2009. - x, 205 p. ;23 cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
What is truth? Michael Lynch defends a bold new answer to this question. Traditional theories hold that all truths are true in the same way. More recent theories claim that the concept of truth is of no real importance. Lynch argues against both these extremes: truth is a functional property whose function can be performed in more than one way.
Electronic reproduction.
Oxford :
Oxford University Press,
2009.
(Oxford Scholarship Online).
Mode of access: World Wide Web. System requirements: Internet Explorer 6.0 (or higher) or Firefox 2.0 (or higher).
ISBN: 9780199218738 Subjects--Topical Terms:
133990
Truth.
LC Class. No.: BD171
Dewey Class. No.: 121
Truth as one and many
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What is truth? Michael Lynch defends a bold new answer to this question. Traditional theories hold that all truths are true in the same way. More recent theories claim that the concept of truth is of no real importance. Lynch argues against both these extremes: truth is a functional property whose function can be performed in more than one way.
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